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This paper considers asset pricing in a general equilibrium model in which some, but not all, agents
suffer from inflation illusion. Illusionary investors mistake changes in nominal interest rates for changes
in real rates, while smart investors understand the Fisher equation. The presence of smart investors
ensures that the equilibrium nominal interest rate moves with expected inflation. The model also predicts
a nonmonotonic relationship between the price-to-rent ratio on housing and nominal interest rates
-- housing booms occur both when the nominal rate is especially low and when it is especially high.
In either situation, disagreement about real interest rates between smart and illusionary investors stimulates
borrowing and lending and drives up the price of collateral. The resulting housing boom is stronger
if credit markets are more developed. We document that many countries experienced a housing boom
in the high-inflation 1970s and a second, stronger, boom in the low-inflation 2000s.
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Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argue that investors who suﬀer from inﬂation illusion price assets as
if real payoﬀs are discounted at the nominal interest rate. They use this idea to rationalize the
stock market slump of the 1970s, which coincided with high inﬂation and high nominal interest
rates. More recently, inﬂation illusion has again become a prominent theme in the ﬁnancial
press, because the 2000s housing boom coincides with low inﬂation and low nominal interest
rates.1 However, an early critique of the inﬂation illusion hypothesis (Summers 1983) points
out that the 1970s saw a housing boom coincide with high nominal interest rates. International
evidence presented below points to a more general stylized fact: in many countries, house price
booms occurred in the high-inﬂation 1970s and further–typically stronger–booms occurred in
the more recent low-inﬂation environment.
In this paper, we consider the eﬀect of inﬂationillusionon asset prices in a general equilibrium
model with heterogeneous agents. The key assumptions are that (i) agents who suﬀer from
inﬂation illusion interact with “smart” agents in markets for nominal credit instruments and
(ii) borrowing must be backed by real estate. We show under these assumptions that nominal
interest rates move with smart agents’ inﬂation expectations, and housing booms occur whenever
these expectations are either especially high or low. Moreover, the housing boom is stronger
when credit markets are more developed, which suggests that recent ﬁnancial development may
have increased the potential for inﬂation illusion to drive house prices.
We are led to consider investor heterogeneity because we want our model to account for
movements in nominal interest rates. In the data, nominal rates comove with measures of
expected inﬂation, which suggests that at least some investors are aware of the distinction
between real and nominal rates. For example, even if stock prices were low in the high inﬂation
1970s because illusionary investors were discounting at high nominal rates, someone must have
also priced high inﬂation expectations into nominal rates. In our model, there are smart investors
who understand the Fisher equation: bond returns are given by the nominal interest rate minus
1For example, see Pam Woodall’s survey on world property markets in the Economist on March 29, 2003. The
article “Castles in Hot Air” in this report and an earlier article, “Going through the Roof” in the Economist on
March 28, 2002, argue that inﬂation illusion fuels the recent house price boom.
2expected inﬂation. At the same time, there are illusion investors who believe that all changes in
nominal rates reﬂect changes in real interest rates. The equilibrium nominal interest rate then
moves–typically less than one for one–with changes in smart investors’ inﬂation expectations.
The key eﬀect in the model is that illusionary and smart investors disagree about real interest
rates when smart investors’ inﬂation expectations are either especially high or low. In either
case, disagreement generates increased borrowing and lending among households as well as a
house price boom. To see how disagreement about real rates obtains, assume ﬁrst that smart
investors’ inﬂation expectations rise above the historical mean and thus drive up nominal interest
rates. Illusionary investors attribute any increase in nominal rates to an increase in real rates.
As a result, they end up perceiving higher real rates than smart investors. In contrast, if smart
investors have unusually low inﬂation expectations and drive down nominal rates, illusionary
investors perceive lower real rates than smart investors.
Figure 1: Housing booms under different inflation scenarios
smart households illusionary households
1970s expect high inﬂation
(high nominal rate) perceive low real rate perceive high real rate
=⇒ borrow and buy houses =⇒ lend
2000s expect low inﬂation
(low nominal rate) perceive high real rate perceive low real rate
=⇒ lend =⇒ borrow and buy houses
Disagreement about real interest rates generates house price booms if borrowing must be
backed by real estate. Indeed, increased credit market activity raises the demand for collateral,
which in turn drives up house prices. More speciﬁcally, our model generates two scenarios for
3a housing boom, illustrated in Figure 1. The scenarios diﬀer in which group of households
perceives lower real rates and thus drives up house prices. In a low inﬂation environment, such
as the 2000s, the increased demand for housing and mortgages is due to illusionary agents, who
mistake low nominal rates for low real rates, while smart investors are happy to invest in bonds.
In times of high expected inﬂation, such as the 1970s, the roles of the two groups are reversed:
smart investors borrow and shift their portfolio toward real estate, while illusion agents are
deterred from mortgages, and housing, by high nominal rates.
The mechanism we emphasize works only if housing serves as collateral. If borrowing was
not possible, disagreement about real interest rates would lead some agents to rebalance their
portfolios from housing toward bonds and other agents to shift funds in the opposite direction.
It is then not obvious why house prices should increase; indeed, in our model, they remain
unchanged. However, if agents who perceive low real rates can build leveraged portfolios, thus
investing more than their own wealth in housing, disagreement raises the demand for housing
suﬃciently to generate a boom. Moreover, the eﬀect is stronger the more borrowers can leverage
their portfolios: in the model, the equilibrium house price is increasing in the maximal loan-to-
value ratio. More generally, broader access to credit and lower transaction costs in the credit
market can be expected to work in the same direction.
While our model is motivated by disagreement about real interest rates that emerges because
some investors suﬀer from inﬂation illusion, our formal analysis only assumes that investors
disagree about the real payoﬀ on nominal bonds. The theoretical eﬀect we highlight is thus
more general and could apply in situations where disagreement derives from other sources of
heterogeneity. One example is diﬀerences in tax rates: investors in high tax brackets perceive
a lower real return on bonds–and, if interest is tax deductible, a lower cost of borrowing–than
investors in lower brackets. Another source of disagreement about real rates is diﬀerences in
inﬂation expectations. This is considered in Piazzesi and Schneider (2006), where we use inﬂation
surveys to document diﬀerences in expected inﬂation rates across age cohorts in the 1970s and
quantify the eﬀect of such diﬀerences for house and stock price movements at that time.
4We have described illusionary investors as investors who mistake changes in nominal inter-
est rates for changes in real rates. This mistake does not require investors to be unaware of
inﬂation or to be wrong about the inﬂation rate. All that matters is that investors confuse real
and nominal returns when making portfolio choice decisions. For example, consider an illusion-
ary investor who compares the utility he obtains from buying a home to the nominal cost of
borrowing. This investor agrees with his smart neighbor about expected inﬂation. However,
the diﬀerence between the two neighbors is that the smart neighbor actually uses the expected
inﬂation rate to compute the real cost of his mortgage. Indeed, disagreement about real interest
rates does not require disagreement about inﬂation–diﬀerences in agents’ understanding of the
impact of inﬂation on returns is enough.2
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the empirical implications of inﬂation illusion
in equity and real estate markets. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) decompose the dividend
yield on stocks into three components: expected dividend growth, a subjective risk premium
(identiﬁed from a cross-sectional regression), and a “mispricing term.”They show that positive
correlation of dividend yields with inﬂation is mostly due to the mispricing term. This indicates
that stocks are undervalued by conventional measures when inﬂation is high.3 Brunnermeier
and Julliard (2006) examine the relationship between house prices and inﬂation. They derive a
decomposition for the price-rent ratio, that is, the price-dividend ratio on housing. Using data
from the U.K. housing market, they construct a mispricing component of the price-rent ratio
that is negatively related to inﬂation. By their measure, houses thus appear overvalued when
inﬂation is low.
There are few formal models of inﬂation illusion. The so-called Fed model, widely used by
practitioners, is sometimes used to motivate a monotonic relationship between asset prices and
inﬂation. According to the Fed model, inﬂation illusion leads investors to apply a modiﬁed
2This observation implies that we cannot derive evidence about illusion or the fraction of illusionary agents
in the population from inﬂation surveys. In particular, many investors may suﬀer from inﬂation illusion today,
even though the Michigan inﬂation survey does not indicate much inﬂation disagreement during the 2000s. It
is an open and interesting question how we can design surveys (e.g., about mortgage planning) that are able to
distinguish between illusion and disagreement.
3Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2005) study the cross section of stock returns and show that CAPM betas
decrease with the inﬂation rate. This ﬁnding is also consistent with inﬂation illusion; when inﬂation is high, the
compensation for each unit of market beta is lower than what the overall diﬀerence in stock returns and riskless
securities would suggest.
5Gordon growth formula to determine the price-dividend ratio on long-lived assets: instead of
using the real interest rate to discount future (real) cash ﬂows as in the usual formula, investors
discount at the nominal rate. The modiﬁed formula is useful for thinking about stocks that
appear undervalued in the 1970s and overvalued in the 1990s.4 Its application to the housing
market, however, runs into Summers’ critique–house prices should be low together with stock
prices in the 1970s.
The Fed model does not deliver a complete account of asset prices under inﬂation illusion
because it takes the nominal interest rate as exogenous. It therefore sidesteps the question
why nominal rates comove with expected inﬂation. In contrast, our general equilibrium model
of inﬂation illusion determines the nominal rate endogenously and links it to smart investors’
inﬂation expectations. In addition, our model is not subject to the Summers critique. Indeed,
inﬂation illusion matters in our model when inﬂation is far from its historical mean in either
direction, and it induces a nonmonotonic relationship between mispricing in the housing market
and inﬂation. The inﬂation illusion hypothesis is thus consistent with housing booms not only
in the low-interest 2000s but also in the high-interest 1970s.
Basak and Yan (2005) also consider a general equilibrium model in which preferences of
illusioninvestorsare deﬁned overnominalconsumption. With power utility,investorswho expect
high inﬂation thus eﬀectively discount the future at a lower (higher) rate if the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is larger (smaller) than one and interest rates reﬂect these preferences.
Our approach diﬀers in its emphasis on heterogeneity and housing as collateral (as in Kiyotaki
and Moore 1997). Moreover, the preferences of illusion investors in our model do not depend on
expected inﬂation.
The purpose of this paper is to isolate the eﬀects of inﬂation illusion on house prices and
interest rates in general equilibrium; we thus abstract from many other factors that matter for
asset prices. In particular, we do not consider other possible links between inﬂation and house
price booms. Feldstein (1980) has shown that the tax treatment of houses and mortgages makes
housing a more attractive asset when expected inﬂation is high. On the one hand, inﬂation
4Ritter and Warr (2002), Sharpe (2002), and Asness (2003) document that dividend yields on stocks are indeed
highly correlated with nominal interest rates.
6increases taxable nominal capital gains, which are more easily sheltered from tax for housing
than for, say, equity. On the other hand, the inﬂation increases tax-deductible nominal mortgage
interest and thus lowers the eﬀective cost of borrowing.5
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents cross-country evidence on price-rent
ratios, using various house-price measures. Section III presents our heterogeneous agent model
with inﬂation illusion. Section IV describes equilibrium housing booms in high and low inﬂation
environments. Section V explains how these equilibria capture the historical experience of the
1970s and 2000s. Section VI concludes and discusses future research. Proofs are collected in the
appendix.
II Cross-Country Evidence
We construct an annual cross-country dataset for the period 1970 - 2004. This sample period
is dictated by the availability of house price data. The dataset covers 12 countries: Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,
and United States.
Price-Dividend Ratios for Stocks
To measure the price-dividend ratio for stocks, we rely on Morgan-Stanley Country In-
dices available from the website www.msci.com. For each country, we obtain two annual se-
ries, labeled “price index” (PI) and “gross index” (GI), and compute the dividend yield as
(GIt/Gt−1)/(PIt/PIt−1)−1. This procedure recovers a price-dividend ratio with interpretable
units. For example, the average pd-ratios in the United States and the United Kingdom were
35.9 and 26, respectively, over the 1970 - 2004 period.
5There is an interesting connection between this second eﬀect and our analysis. When smart investors are in
diﬀerent tax brackets, an increase in expected inﬂation will make the eﬀective costs of borrowing computed by
Feldstein more diﬀerent across households. Agents thus disagree more about (after-tax) real rates when inﬂation
is high. Through the mechanism described above, this should generate further upward pressure on house prices:
agents in high tax brackets would ﬁnd it cheaper to take out a mortgage and drive up house prices, while agents
in low tax brackets would be happy to lend.
7Price-Rent Ratios for Houses
The measurement of price-dividend ratios for housing, or price-rent ratios, is more diﬃcult,
because houses do not trade on exchanges like stocks. We have two options–data from national
accounts or data on price indices constructed by the national central banks available through the
Bank of International Settlements (BIS). For the national accounts, we follow the methodology
in Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (Forthcoming). We measure the numerator as the value of the
aggregate residential housing stock and the denominator as aggregate expenditures on housing
services, including owner-estimated rents. We have data from national accounts for the United
States and the United Kingdom. Based on price indices constructed by the national central
banks, we measure the national residential price index divided by the consumer price index for
each country. These data are available from the BIS. To measure real rents, we use the rent
component of each country’s consumer price index available from Datastream and divide by the
consumer price index.6
National account data have several advantages. First, the resulting price-rent ratios have
meaningful units, because the numerator and denominator are measured in dollars. For example,
the average price-rent ratios in the United States and the United Kingdom over the 1970-2004
period were 17.6 and 26.5, respectively. In contrast, the units of pd-ratios based on house price
and rent indices are not meaningful; the ratios are normalized to 1 in some base year (which is
1985 in Figure 2.) The ratios are only useful for looking at percentage changes over time.
Second, the price-rent ratios from national accounts do not involve any quality judgements.
Again, the reason is that they are measured in dollars. In contrast, an index construction tracks
the evolution of the purchase or rental value of an appropriately deﬁned “unit of housing.” The
deﬁnition of “one unit”of housing does not only involvethe square footage of livingspace but also
quality changes of that space over time. The quality judgements are especially problematic for
price-rent ratios, because the numerator and denominator are constructed by diﬀerent agencies
which may use diﬀerent deﬁnitions.
6There are two missing observations in the BIS dataset. First, we interpolate the 2004 observation for Ireland
using data from the Annual Housing Statistics Bulletin published by the Irish Department of the Environment,
Heritage, and Local Government. Second, we interpolate the 1970 observation for Spain assuming that real house
price growth is equal to real rent growth for that year.
8We can correct for quality changes at low frequencies by taking out linear time trends from
real rents in the denominator. We will plot the resulting corrected ratios as dotted lines in
our ﬁgures. Examples of such low-frequency changes in quality are modern amenities–such as
air conditioning, central heating, and electricity–which were absent from homes a century ago.
Today’s homes also beneﬁt from infrastructure in cities–such as roads, sidewalks, and public
transportation–which has improved slowly over time. However, correcting linear time trends
do not take into account high-frequency changes in quality such as quality variations of homes
traded over the business cycle or shifting neighborhood eﬀects.
Finally, price-rent ratios from national accounts are available for a long time period, while
most house price indices start in the 1970s. In this paper, we do not exploit this advantage of
the national accounts data, because we focus on stock and house price movements around the
high-inﬂation episode in the 1970s and the recent low-inﬂation episode.
Inﬂation and Real Interest Rates
For each country, we obtain annual consumer-price inﬂation and the three-month nominal
interest rate on government bonds from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.
We construct the ex post real rate as the diﬀerence between the nominal rate and the inﬂation
rate.
Cross-Country Empirical Facts
Figures 2 and 3 show the price-dividend ratios of houses and stocks together with inﬂation
and the real rate for each country. The pd-ratios of houses in Figure 2 are measured with BIS
data, while those in Figure 3 are from national accounts. We focus on two episodes. During the
inﬂation episode of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the pd-ratio of housing was relatively high,
while the pd-ratio of stocks was relatively low. During the disinﬂation episode of the 2000s, the
same situation emerges. Moreover, ex post real rates were low, or even negative, during both
episodes.
FIGURES 2 AND 3 HERE
9III The Model
Our model describes heterogeneous households, some of whom may suﬀer from inﬂation illusion.
Households trade real estate and nominal assets (“bonds”) with each other as well as a “rest
of the economy” sector. Real estate is an asset that cannot be sold short but that can be used
as collateral. Bonds are special because they promise nominal payoﬀs and because they can be
held in negative quantities.
Setup
There are two dates, 0 and 1, and one consumption good. There is a unit mass of risk-neutral
households who discount date 1 consumption by the factor β. Households can invest in nominal
bonds and real estate. A unit of real estate (or “houses”) trades at the price p at date 0 and
is expected to pay oﬀ p  at date 1. This payoﬀ equals the resale price of the house plus any
dividend from housing (which may include utility from ownership etc.) Real estate cannot be
sold short. Households can buy or sell one-period nominal bonds. If they choose to borrow by
issuing bonds, they must respect a collateral constraint: the value of the bonds issued must be
less than φ times the value of their house. The parameter φ is the maximal loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio.
Nominal bonds trade at a price 1/R at date 0, where R is the (gross) nominal interest rate
from date 0 to date 1. Households expect the nominal bond to pay oﬀ x goods at date 1.
The expected payoﬀ x is subjective and may be diﬀerent for smart investors and illusionary
households. For smart households who understand the Fisher equation and expect inﬂation π,
the expected payoﬀ of a nominal bond is x =1 /π.7 Households who suﬀer from inﬂation illusion
do not necessarily associate x with their expected inﬂation rate.
Every household enters the period with an endowment of goods y, an endowment of houses
¯ h0, and an amount of goods ¯ b0 from past bond market activity. For given market prices p and
1/R, as well as expected payoﬀs p  and x, a household chooses consumption c and c ,t h eq u a n t i t y
7To see why, consider a nominal bond that costs 1/R dollars today and pays $1 tomorrow, or 1/q
  units of
consumption, where q
  is the price of consumption tomorrow. Now consider a portfolio of q nominal bonds. The
price of the portfolio is 1/R units of numeraire and its payoﬀ is q/q
  =1 /π units of consumption tomorrow. The
model thus determines the price 1/R of a nominal bond in $.
10of houses h, and the amount of goods invested in bonds b to solve
maxc + βc  (1)
c + b + ph = w(p): =b0 + ph0 + y
c  =( Rx)b+ p h,
c,c ,h≥ 0,
−b ≤ φph.
This simple setup does not make explicit the utility agents obtain from housing. One way
to interpret it is that housing services and other consumption are perfect substitutes, that the
dividend from houses owned prior to trading at date 0 is contained in y, and that the date 1
dividend per unit of house is contained in p . Our analysis holds ﬁxed the dividend from housing,
so that changes in the house price p  represent changes in the price-rent ratio. We normalize the
aggregate quantity of houses to 1. The initial endowment of housing units ¯ h0 thus represents
the share of the total housing stock that is not acquired by households at date 0. We assume
that households must own all houses after trading at date 0. In particular, the household sector
cannot, on aggregate, sell houses to the rest of the economy. We thus assume h0 < 1.
The “rest of the economy” (ROE) sector consolidates the government, foreign, and business
sectors. It may also contain “old” households who do not plan for the future, because date 0 is
the last period of their life. The ROE sells 1−¯ h0 > 0 units of real estate in the housing market
and ¯ b ≥ 0 worth of bonds in the credit market. It also redeems all bonds that households enter
date 0 with (worth ¯ b0). It consumes the proceeds from these trades:
CROE = p
 
1 − ¯ h0
 
+¯ b − b0.
The value of new housing units p
 
1 − ¯ h0
 
corresponds to gross residential investment plus the
value of houses sold by “old” households to households planning for the future at date 0. This
interpretation justiﬁes our assumption that ¯ h0 < 1.
The bond endowment ¯ b0 consists of all payments households receive from past credit market
11activity, including interest on bonds held in the previous period. Household income y comprises
labor income and dividends on real estate the household owns before trading at date 0. We
assume throughout that the sum of this initial non-housing wealth is large enough that the
household sector can aﬀord to buy all bonds supplied by the rest of the economy:
(2) ¯ b<¯ b0 + y.
We view this assumption as mild since changes in aggregate household sector asset positions
tend to be small relative to aggregate income, as documented in Piazzesi and Schneider (2006).
We assume that expectations about payoﬀs on bonds and houses at date 1 are given exoge-
nously. Households agree on the expected payoﬀ from houses p . However, the perceived payoﬀ x
of a nominal bond depends on households’ understanding of real interest rates. To accommodate
these diﬀerences in perceived bond payoﬀs, we work with a ﬁnite number of household types,
indexed by i.T h e r ea r e αi households of type i, with
 
iαi = 1. The market prices of bonds
and houses at date 0 are determined endogenously: 1/R and p, respectively. When choosing
portfolios, households thus agree on the expected real housing return p /p, but they disagree on
the expected real bond return Rxi, the ex ante real rate.
We consider temporary equilibria in which date 0 prices are endogenous but expectations
about future payoﬀs are exogenously given (as in Grandmont 1977). A temporary equilibrium
consists of a house price p a n da ni n t e r e s tr a t eR together with date 0 consumption and asset
choices for the various types
 
ci,b i,h i 
such that (i) households optimize given their (subjective)
expected payoﬀs
 
p ,x i 









i αici + CROE = y.
The market clearing condition for goods illustrates how ROE consumption accommodates devi-
ations of household consumption from household income.
12Modeling Inﬂation Illusion
Diﬀerences in the subjective bond payoﬀs xi capture how illusionary and smart investors
diﬀer in their perceptions of real rates. We always assume that smart agents expect nominal
bonds to pay oﬀ x =1 /π. In other words, smart agents understand the Fisher equation which
says that the (ex ante) real interest rate equals the nominal interest rate–quoted in the market–
minus the expected inﬂation rate:
(3) real rate = logR − logπ.
In contrast, agents who suﬀer from inﬂation illusion believe that the payoﬀ of nominal bonds
x is constant. As a result, they view real interest rates as equal to nominal interest rates up to
a constant:
(4) real rate = logR − constant.
In particular, they interpret positive deviations of the nominal interest rates from its long-run
average as an instance of high real rates, and they interpret unusually low nominal rates as
unusually low real rates.
To generate time series predictions, we perform comparative statics exercises with respect
to the distribution of nominal bond payoﬀs xi. In particular, we compute equilibria for three
versions of the model. Our benchmark exercise assumes that all agents agree on the same,
moderate, expected bond payoﬀ. Intuitively, it captures a time period where expected inﬂation
and the nominal rate are at their long-run averages. While agents in the model act as if they
agree, they do think about interest rates in very diﬀerent terms. Smart agents observe the
nominal rate and believe that it reﬂects moderate inﬂation because of the Fisher equation (3).
In contrast, illusion investors believe that it reﬂects a normal level of the real rate because of
equation (4).
While this diﬀerence in thinking about interest rates does not matter in normal times, it
matters when expected inﬂation and nominal rates deviate from their long-run average. We
13consider two scenarios, where expected bond payoﬀs diﬀer across agents. Under the 1970s
scenario, smart investors expect high inﬂation and thus believe that bond payoﬀs are lower than
average. However, illusion investors continue to believe that real interest rates are equal to
nominal rates up to a constant. Formally, illusion investors thus behave as if bond payoﬀs are
unchanged from the benchmark. Under the 2000s scenarios, smart investors expect low inﬂation
and thus believe that bond payoﬀs are higher than average. As before, illusion investors act as if
bond payoﬀs have not moved. In both cases, what matters in terms of the model is disagreement
about ex ante real rates. It is thus helpful to ﬁrst analyze a generic case, where some agents
expect high bond payoﬀs and others expect low bond payoﬀs. This is what we do below. We
then use the formal results to discuss the 1970s and 2000s scenarios.
IV Equilibrium House Prices and Interest Rates
In this section, we characterize equilibrium prices, ﬁrst for a benchmark case with identical
subjective real rates, and then for the case of heterogeneous subjective real rates. The latter
case is used below to argue that inﬂation illusioninduces house price booms when smart investors
have subjective real rates that are either very high or very low.
Solution to the Household Problem
The collateral constraint implies that households cannot borrow against future income. In-
stead, borrowing is useful only to set up leveraged portfolio strategies that increase the return
on wealth. To solve problem (1), a household must therefore ﬁrst determine the best portfolio
strategy. If the return on the optimal portfolio is higher than the discount rate β−1,t h e ni ti s
optimal to invest all date 0 wealth w. If the best portfolio return is lower than the discount
rate, it is instead optimal to save nothing and simply consume w at date 0.
Two polar portfolio strategies are available. If the subjective expected return on bonds, Rxi,
is higher than the return on housing, p /p, then the optimal portfolio is 100% invested in bonds.
If the expected bond return, or equivalently, the expected cost of borrowing, is lower than the
housing return, the best portfolio strategy is to borrow up to the collateral constraint, and invest
14in housing. For every unit invested in housing, only 1−φ units must come out of initial wealth,
because φ units can be borrowed. Therefore, the expected return on wealth invested in the









Below, we focus on equilibria in which the return on housing is less than or equal to the
discount rate: p /p ≤ β−1. Forthis case, the optimal consumption-savingsand portfoliodecisions
can be summarized as follows, using two cutoﬀ points for the real rate Rxi.I fRxi >β −1,t h e
household invests all wealth in bonds; he consumes nothing at date 0 and buys no houses. If
Rxi <φ −1  
p /p − (1 − φ)β−1 
, the household borrows up to the collateral constraint, invests
his own wealth plus all borrowed funds in housing, and again consumes nothing. Finally, if
Rxi is in between the two cutoﬀs (this is possible whenever p /p < β−1), then the household
consumes all wealth at date 0 and does not invest. Finally, at the cutoﬀ points themselves, the
household is indiﬀerent between neighboring strategies.
Identical Subjective Real Rates
As a benchmark, we consider an equilibrium in which all households agree on the same ex
ante real rate Rx∗. In this case, the expected bond payoﬀ x∗ =1 /π∗ is determined by the
inﬂation expectations of smart agents π∗. Since both houses and bonds are in positive net
supply, the expected returns on the two assets must be equal and also greater than or equal to
the discount rate. We consider an equilibrium in which there is some consumption at date t.
To make households indiﬀerent between consumption and saving, both returns must equal the
discount rate:




Here the ﬁrst equality is again the Fisher equation: the nominal interest rate equals the ex ante
real rate–here the discount rate–multiplied by the expected rate of inﬂation π∗. The second
equality says that the house price is the present discounted value of future payoﬀs, discounted
15at the real interest rate. In the benchmark equilibrium, the house price is independent of
expected inﬂation.
We assume that initial endowments and asset supplies are such that markets can clear at
these prices. In particular, the supply of assets, with houses evaluated at the prices p = βp 
implied by (5), must be smaller than the initial wealth of the household sector:
(6) ¯ b + βp  < ¯ b0 + βp ¯ h0 + y.
Similarlyto (2), this assumption is also satisﬁed if changes in aggregate household asset positions
are small relative to income.
Heterogeneous Subjective Real Rates
We assume that a fraction α of households expects nominal bonds to have low payoﬀs x,
while a fraction 1 − α of households expects high payoﬀs ¯ x>x . We refer to these two groups
as “low interest” and “high interest” households, respectively. To again ensure the existence of
equilibria in which some consumption takes place at date 0, we modify condition (6) to
(7) ¯ b + βp x
¯ x
< ¯ b0 + βp x
¯ x
¯ h0 + y.
If some new housing units are bought by households planning for the future at date 0 (¯ h0 < 1),
this condition is stronger than (6). In the equilibria below, βp x
¯ x is an upper bound for the
house price. The condition is thus still satisﬁed provided changes in asset positions–including
investment on housing–are small relative to income.
Proposition 1 characterizes equilibrium prices as a function of the share α of low-interest
households. We know from the benchmark equilibrium that when households agree on their
subjective real rates (that is, α =0o rα = 1), the Fisher equation holds and the house price is
at its benchmark level p = βp . When households disagree, the nominal rate reﬂects a weighted
average of their payoﬀ expectations. Moreover, suﬃcient disagreement in the population gen-
erates a house price boom (p>β p  ). The proposition formally states this result for the case
where the maximal loan-to-value ratio φ is suﬃciently large relative to the supply of bonds from
16the rest of the economy ¯ b.F o rl o wφ or high ¯ b, the same type of equilibrium continues to exist,
but it need not be unique. We relegate the analysis of the latter case to the appendix.





> ¯ h0¯ b. There is a unique equilibrium in which
(a) the nominal interest rate is continuous and nondecreasing in the fraction α of low-interest
agents; there exist cutoﬀs ¯ αR and αR such that 1 > ¯ αR ≥ αR > 0a n d
R = β−1/x if α ≥ ¯ αR,
R = β−1/¯ x if α ≤ αR,
R ∈ [β−1/¯ x,β−1/x]o t h e r w i s e .
(b) the house price is hump-shaped in α;t h e r ee x i s t sαp ∈ (0,α R) such that
p = βp  if α/ ∈ (αp, ¯ αR],
p>β p   otherwise.
Proof: See the appendix.
The pattern of interest rates and house prices is shown in Figure 4. To obtain some intuition,
consider ﬁrst an economy where all agents agree on real interest rates (α = 0). This economy is
in a benchmark equilibrium, where households are indiﬀerent between consumption and savings
as well as between diﬀerent portfolios. Consider now what happens when some high-interest
agents are replaced by low-interest agents, that is, α rises. At the original prices, the subjective
real interest rate of low-interest agents is below the discount rate, and also below the return on
housing. Consumption and bonds become unattractive for the low-interest agents: they prefer
to invest in housing and also take on mortgages to exploit the low (subjective) cost of borrowing.
For small α, this makes little diﬀerence in the credit market: the high-interest agents, who are
indiﬀerent between consumption and bonds, are happy to fund a few more mortgages at the
original interest rate. Similarly, the house price need not change as long as there are enough
17high-interest agents who are willing to sell houses.
FIGURE 4 HERE
The situation changes once there is a critical mass of low-interest agents. As these agents
become more numerous, their total wealth–which they invest in housing equity–goes up. Their
demand for houses at the original benchmark price βp  eventually outpaces the available supply.
For markets to clear, building leveraged portfolios must become less attractive. There are two
ways in which this can happen: the cost of borrowing can rise or the return on housing can
fall. Part (a) of the proposition shows that the former occurs: the nominal interest rate rises
to reﬂect, at least in part, the low expected bond payoﬀ. Part (b) shows that the house price
also reacts: it goes up in order to lower the expected return on housing. Put diﬀerently, with
suﬃcient disagreement about ex ante real rates, higher housing demand due to cheap mortgages
drives up house prices. This occurs even though everyone agrees that the expected future payoﬀ
from houses has not changed.
To see what happens for high α, consider an economy where all agents agree on low bond
payoﬀs. This economy is again in a benchmark equilibrium, but now with a high nominal
interest rate reﬂecting the low payoﬀ expectations. Assume next that some low-interest agents
are replaced by high-interest agents, that is, α falls. At the original benchmark prices, the
subjective real bond return of the high-interest agents now rises above the discount rate and
the housing return. High-interest agents thus prefer to invest all wealth in bonds. As long as
there are not too many of them, this does not aﬀect prices: they can easily sell houses and buy
bonds at the benchmark prices. However, once the high-interest agents reach a critical mass,
the nominal interest rate must fall. A lower nominal interest rate not only reduces the bond
demand of the high-interest agents, but it also encourages the low-interest agents to take on
mortgages, which increases the supply of bonds. The availability of cheap borrowing in turn
increases the demand for houses from the low-interest agents: we are back in the region where
disagreement increases house prices.
Our ﬁnding that disagreement about ex ante real rates leads to house price booms is related
to the classic result that, in a market with short sale constraints and heterogeneous beliefs,
18assets are valued by the most optimistic investor (Miller 1977).8 The key diﬀerence between our
setup and Miller’s is that we do not assume disagreement about payoﬀs to the booming asset–in
our case, housing–itself. Instead, there is disagreement about subjective real interest rates. The
similarity arises because mortgages and housing together can be used to form the composite
asset housing equity, deﬁned as housing net of mortgage debt. The collateral constraint implies
that housing equity cannot be sold short. Moreover, there is disagreement about its expected
payoﬀ p  −bRx. In equilibrium, the value of housing equity is driven by investors who are most
optimistic about its payoﬀ, that is, the investors who believe in low real bond payoﬀs and hence
a low cost of borrowing.
T h eR o l eo fC o l l a t e r a l
Proposition 2 shows that the possibility of borrowing is critical for our results and that house
price booms driven by disagreement are stronger the higher is the leverage ratio.





> ¯ h0¯ b.
(a) If φ = 0, the unique equilibrium has p = βp .
(b) If φ>φ ∗, the house price achieves a maximum at
ˆ p := βp 
 





(c) If φ>φ ∗,t h ec u t o ﬀ sαp ¯ αp, ¯ αR,a n dαR that govern house price and interest rate behavior
are decreasing in the maximal LTV value φ.I np a r t i c u l a r ,w eh a v e




¯ αp (φ)=1 −





8In the simplest version of Miller’s argument, risk-neutral investors disagree about stock payoﬀs. If borrowing
is allowed, the stock price must make the most optimistic investor indiﬀerent between holding stocks and bonds–if
this were not true, the most optimistic investor would run a leveraged strategy, creating excess demand for stocks.
All other investors, who are prevented from shorting the stock–remain on the sidelines.
19Proof: See the appendix.
Part (a) of the proposition says that if the maximal LTV ratio φ is equal to zero–in other
words, bond holdings are constrained to be nonnegative–then the house price is constant regard-
less of the extent of disagreement. In an economy without borrowing, disagreement about real
rates will only be reﬂected in the portfolio positions: low-interest agents perceive a low return
on bonds and hold only houses, while high-interest agents perceive a high return on bonds and
hold only bonds. The possibility of leverage is thus necessary for disagreement to generate house
price booms. Part (b) says that when there is suﬃcient leverage–here we focus again on the case
φ>φ ∗ that is also considered in Proposition 1–the maximal price ˆ p that can occur in a house
price boom is increasing in the loan-to-value ratio φ. The comparative static of increasing φ is
represented by the dotted lines in Figure 4.
Part (c) characterizes the cutoﬀ levels for the fraction of low-interest agents in terms of the
maximal LTV ratio φ. It says that the cutoﬀs αp and ¯ αp for the house price are decreasing in
the maximal leverage ratio φ that borrowers can achieve. At values of α in the interval [αp, ¯ αp],
there is suﬃcient disagreement such that a house price boom must occur in any equilibrium.
Higher φ means that an individual borrower can issue more bonds relative to his own wealth
and can thus invest a larger multiple of his own wealth in housing. The eﬀect on prices is best
seen by starting from an equilibrium with agreement. Suppose ﬁrst that everyone agrees on
high real rates and replace a few agents with low-interest agents, who now become leveragers.
Higher demand for houses per individual borrower means that it takes fewer leveragers to upset
the original equilibrium and force an increase in the house price. This explains why the lower
bound αp is decreasing in φ.
For the converse thought experiment, suppose that initially everyone agrees on low real rates
and then replace a few agents with high-interest types. At the original equilibrium prices, the
high-interest agents invest exclusively in bonds. With higher φ, it takes more bond investors
to upset the original equilibrium, because low-interest investors can absorb more bond demand
simply by issuing more mortgages, even without an increase in the house price. Therefore, it
takes more bond investors to force a drop in interest rates that ﬁnally leads to an increase in the
20house price. This explains why the upper bound ¯ αp is also decreasing in φ. The upper bound
is also decreasing in the supply of bonds from the rest of the economy. The more such bonds
are outstanding, the less important it is for low-interest investors to supply additional bonds. It
thus again takes more high-interest types to force a drop in the interest rate.
V House Price Booms and Inﬂation
To compare the behavior of house prices across decades, consider now three distinct environ-
ments. Let x∗ denote bond payoﬀ expectations in a normal environment with average inﬂation
and nominal rates. As discussed above, illusion agents always expect a bond payoﬀ x∗ and do
not relate it to their expected inﬂation rate. Let xlo <x ∗ denote a low payoﬀ that was expected
by smart investors during the 1970s when they expected inﬂation to be high, xlo =1 /πhi.L e t
xhi =1 /πlo >x ∗ denote a high bond payoﬀ that was expected by smart investors in the 2000s
when they expected low inﬂation, πlo <π hi. In a normal year, smart investors also expect a
payoﬀ equal (or close) to x∗ =1 /π∗. If the two investor types happen to agree, the economy is
simply in a benchmark equilibrium, where the Fisher equation (for the smart investors) implies
a nominal interest rate of β−1π∗ and the house price is βp .9
Now consider the 1970s scenario, where smart investors’ inﬂation expectations jump to πhi >
π∗. The price reaction follows from Propositions 1 and 2, setting x = xlo =1 /πhi and ¯ x =
x∗. Suppose that at the relevant parameters (α,φ), the economy is in the region described in
Proposition 2 where the nominal interest rate rises above β−1π∗ but not all the way to β−1πhi,
while the house price rises above βp . We then obtain an equilibrium in which a house price
boom coincides with a high nominal interest rate. When smart investors see the nominal rate,
they consider borrowing a good deal since the nominal rate does not fully reﬂect their high
inﬂation expectations. Their demand for collateral drives up house prices. In contrast, illusion
agents see the nominal rate and believe times are great for investing in bonds.
Under the 2000s scenario, smart investors’ inﬂation expectations are below the long-run
9Even if the agreement is not perfect and the two payoﬀs are simply close, part (b) of Proposition 1 says that
the house price will be close to its benchmark value.
21average at πlo <π ∗. We again read oﬀ prices from Propositions 1 and 2, now setting ¯ x = xhi =
1/πlo and x = x∗. If the economy is in the region where interest rates partially adjust, we obtain
a house price boom that goes along with low nominal interest rates. Moreover, the role of the
two investor types is now reversed: under the 2000s scenario it is illusion investors who are eager
to borrow, since they perceive low real rates. Illusion investors’ demand for houses thus drives
up house prices. In contrast, smart investors prefer to invest in bonds.
Structural Change and the Size of House Price Booms
Changes in the maximal LTV ratio φ can be interpreted as the result of ﬁnancial innovation–
for example, in the screening technology available to intermediaries who originate mortgages.
Proposition 2 suggests two ways in which ﬁnancial development is conducive to housing booms
in a low-inﬂation environment, as under the 2000s scenario. First, part (a) of the proposition
says that higher leverage directly leads to higher house prices. Second, part (b) says that,
with more opportunities for leverage, it takes fewer inﬂation illusion agents to generate enough
disagreement for a house price boom.10 Taken together, these observations suggest that ﬁnancial
development may explain why the house price booms of the 2000s were typically stronger than
those of the 1970s.
Another consequence of ﬁnancial development is that the fraction of households who partici-
pate in mortgage markets has increased recently, especially among lower income households (see,
for example, Doepke and Schneider 2006). The model shows that an extreme increase in the
participation rate is conducive to housing booms (φ =0a n dφ>0c o r r e s p o n dt oaz e r oa n da
100% participation rate, respectively). More generally, one would expect that a smaller increase
has similar eﬀects. Moreover, an inﬂow of poor unsophisticated investors might generate more
disagreement about real rates.
Another structural change that occurred between the 1970s and the 2000s is the increased
opening of U.S. credit markets to foreigners. Doepke and Schneider (2006) show that the net
nominal asset position of the U.S. household sector has reached historical lows in recent years,
10Interestingly, the same argument does not apply to illusion-induced booms in high-inﬂation environments.
The discussion after Proposition 2 implies that, in high-inﬂation environments, higher leverage implies that it
takes more illusion investors to generate a boom.
22while foreigners have become important net nominal lenders. In our model, this change is
captured by a reduction in the supply of bonds ¯ b provided to the household sector by the rest of
the economy. Proposition 2 shows that higher ¯ b increases the parameter region where housing
booms can occur by keeping nominal interest rates low even if a lot of investors believe that real
rates are low. Strong foreign demand for bonds thus facilitates housing booms due to illusion
in both high- and low-inﬂation environments.
The Relationship between Inﬂation and Real Estate “Mispricing”
Consider an econometrician whose goal is to decompose house prices into a “fundamental”
and a (residual) “mispricing” component. In the typical application, the fundamental component
is taken to be a risk-adjusted present discounted value of proﬁts to be made from the housing
stock. If the data were generated by our (risk-neutral) model, correct measurement of rents and
real interest rates would thus lead the econometrician to recover the benchmark price βp  as the
fundamental component. The mispricing is then simply p − βp , a series with two peaks that
occur during the 1970s and 2000s. It follows that the relationship between inﬂation and real
estate mispricing is nonlinear: housing booms that push prices beyond fundamentals occur both
at high inﬂation rates (during the 1970s) and at low inﬂation rates (during the 2000s).
If data were generated simply by repeatedly running our model with diﬀerent inﬂation ex-
pectations, an econometrician who regresses his measure of mispricing on inﬂation should not
detect a signiﬁcant relationship. However, the coeﬃcients in a linear regression could turn out to
be (misleadingly) signiﬁcant if there is another factor that changes over time. As one example,
suppose that there is structural change in the credit market, so that φ increases over time, as
discussed above. In this case, the ﬁrst peak of the real estate mispricing series during the high
1970s inﬂation is smaller than its second peak during the low 2000s inﬂation. Thus, a linear
regression of mispricing on inﬂation might uncover a signiﬁcantly negative linear relationship
between real estate mispricing and inﬂation. In this example, the omitted variable “credit mar-
ket development” will be responsible for the ﬁnding, although the true relationship between
inﬂation and mispricing is nonlinear.
The relationship between real estate mispricing and inﬂation is also sensitive to how the
23fundamental component is measured in the face of structural change. For example, suppose
that deregulation of rental markets induces a trend in βp  – and hence house prices – that has
nothing to do with inﬂation. Consider now an econometrician who determines the fundamental
value of housing by estimating a stationary process with the same mean as the observed house
price over his sample. Since he ignores the trend in fundamentals, this econometrician will tend
to ﬁnd negative mispricing early in his sample period and positive mispricing later in the sample
period. If inﬂation also happened to decrease over the sample period, there will be a spurious
negative relationship between mispricing and inﬂation that has nothing to do with inﬂation
illusion.
VI Conclusion
This paper has considered a stylized economy with heterogeneous agents, some of whom suﬀer
from inﬂation illusion. Our model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between house price-
rent ratios and inﬂation: house prices are high whenever inﬂation is far away from its historical
average. According to the model, a high-inﬂation environment–such as the 1970s–is a time when
smart households drive up house prices because they are able to borrow cheaply from illusionary
households. The latter do not realize that nominal rates are high only because expected inﬂation
is high and thus perceive higher real rates than smart households. In contrast, in a low-inﬂation
environment–such as the 2000s–the role of the two groups is reversed: illusionary households
drive up house prices because they think they are borrowing cheaply from smart households.
They do not realize that nominal interest rates are low only because of low expected inﬂation
and thus perceive lower real rates than smart households. Recent ﬁnancial market development
has made borrowing easier, which might explain why the housing boom of the 2000s is more
pronounced than the 1970s boom.
We emphasize that general equilibrium eﬀects matter for thinking about the eﬀect of inﬂation
illusion on asset prices. While the “Fed model” consists of a relationship between endogenous
variables, our model jointly determines both the nominal interest rate and house prices. We have
shown that investor heterogeneity is one way to reconcile the comovement of nominal rates and
24inﬂation with real eﬀects of inﬂation illusion, and also to avoid Summers’ critique. An important
task for future research is to quantify the implications of inﬂation illusion and to compare the
eﬀect we have derived here to other candidate explanations for house-price booms.
Another interesting issue is the eﬀect of inﬂation illusion on stock prices. The cross-country
evidence in this paper shows that the price-dividend ratios of housing and stocks often move in
opposite directions. The mechanism we emphasize can help produce such negative comovement.
Indeed, disagreement about real interest rates makes bonds more attractive to investors who
perceive high real rates, while it makes real estate more attractive to investors who perceive
low real rates. In relative terms, stocks thus become less attractive to both investor types.
The resulting shift in portfolio demand away from stocks should thus lower stock prices while
increasing house prices.
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27A Appendix
This appendix characterizes the equilibria of our model. We begin with three lemmas. Lemma
1 shows that, in any equilibrium, we must have β−1/¯ x ≤ R ≤ β−1/x and p ≥ βp . Lemma 2
derives conditions for the existence of equilibria with p = βp , while Lemma 3 does the same for
the case p>β p  .P r o p o s i t i o n s1 ∗ and 2∗ then provide a full description of the equilibria that can
occur. In particular, these propositions do not assume that φ
 ¯ b0 + y
 
> ¯ h0¯ b, an assumption that
was made in the text to ensure uniqueness. We provide a brief discussion of why multiplicity
can occur–and why it is not particularly interesting from an economic perspective here–after
Proposition 2∗. Finally, we derive Propositions 1 and 2 stated in the text.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, β−1/¯ x ≤ R ≤ β−1/x and p ≥ βp .
Proof.I fR<β −1/¯ x, then no household invests in bonds, which cannot be an equilibrium since
bonds are in positive net supply.
If p<β p  , then it is optimal for both household types to save all initial wealth, since the
real return on housing p /p is higher than the discount rate. Summing up the market clearing
conditions for bonds and houses, the house price must satisfy
(A-1) p +¯ b = ¯ b0 + p¯ h0 + y.






p   
1 − ¯ h0
 
y +¯ b0 −¯ b
<β −1,
a contradiction.
Finally, if R>β −1/x, the real rate on bonds perceived by both types is strictly higher than
the discount rate, and, since p ≥ βp  (by the argument in the previous paragraph), the real bond
return is also strictly higher than the return on housing. It follows that no agent wants to hold
housing, which cannot be an equilibrium since houses are in positive net supply.
28Lemma 2. Deﬁne the cutoﬀs








An equilibrium with p = βp  exists if and only if either
(a) α ≥ ¯ αp,i nw h i c hc a s eRx = β−1,o r
(b) α ≤ αp,i nw h i c hc a s eR¯ x = β−1.
Proof. We assume ﬁrst that R¯ x>β −1, which leads to case (a) and below consider R¯ x = β−1,
which leads to case (b). If R¯ x>β −1 = p /p, then high-interest agents hold only bonds. We
must have Rx ≤ β−1, since otherwise nobody holds houses. We cannot have Rx <β −1.I ft h i s
were true, low-interest agents would want to invest all wealth in a leveraged portfolio strategy.
All agents would then invest all wealth, so that the value of the total asset supply would equal
the total value of wealth, and the house price would be determined by (A-1). As argued in
the proof of Lemma 1, condition (6) would then imply p /p < β−1 (cf. Equation (A-2)), which
contradicts our assumption that p = βp .
We conclude that equilibria with p = βp  and R¯ x>β −1 must have Rx = β−1. Low-interest
agents are thus indiﬀerent between bonds, houses, and consumption, while high-interest agents
hold only bonds. Markets can clear at these prices as long as there are suﬃciently many bonds
available to satisfy the demand of the high-interest agents. Bond supply can come either from
the ROE sector or because low-interest agents issue mortgages. We obtain the cutoﬀ for case
(a):
(A-3) ¯ b + φβp  ≥ (1 − α)
 
βp ¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
.
As long as this inequality holds, condition (6) guarantees that the remaining wealth (owned by
the low-interest agents) is high enough such that the latter agents can aﬀord to purchase the
whole housing stock, that is,
(1 − φ)βp  <α
 
βp ¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
.
29Since low-interest agents are indiﬀerent between all portfolio strategies, a suitable number of
them can be assigned to both markets to ensure market clearing. It follows that equilibria with
p = βp  and R¯ x>β −1 exist if and only if condition (A-3) holds.
Suppose now that R¯ x = β−1.S i n c e Rx <β −1 = p /p, low-interest agents will use the
leveraged strategy and hold no bonds. For an equilibrium of this type to exist, we need the
value of the housing stock to be large enough to satisfy the demand of the low-interest agents,
which deﬁnes the cutoﬀ for case (b):
(A-4) (1 − φ)βp  ≥ α
 
βp ¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
.
If this inequality is satisﬁed, condition (6) again ensures that the remaining wealth (owned by
the high-interest agents) is large enough that the high-interest agents can absorb all bonds issued
by the ROE and the low-interest agents, that is
¯ b + φβp  < (1 − α)
 
βp ¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
.
It follows that equilibria with p = βp  and R¯ x = β−1 exist if and only if condition (A-4) holds.
Lemma 3. An equilibrium with p>β p   exists only if φ>0 and at least one of four sets of
conditions holds:
(a) φ>¯ h0¯ b/
 ¯ b0 + y
 
:= φ∗ and
¯ αp >α>1 −
 ¯ b + φˆ p
 
/ ¯ w(ˆ p),
(b) φ<φ ∗ and
¯ αp <α<1 −
 ¯ b + φˆ p
 
/ ¯ w(ˆ p),
(c) αp <α<(1 − φ)ˆ p/w(ˆ p),
(d) φ>0a n d( 1− φ)ˆ p/ ¯ w(ˆ p) ≤ α ≤ 1 −
 ¯ b + φˆ p
 
/ ¯ w(ˆ p).
For all cases, there exist values of α that satisfy the conditions.
Conversely, assume φ>0. If cases (a) or (b) apply, the equilibrium house price and interest
30rate are given by
p =
(1 − α)
 ¯ b0 + y
 
−¯ b
φ − (1 − α)¯ h0
, (A-5)
R = β−1 1
φx
 
βp   







− (1 − φ)
 
. (A-6)
In case (a), p is decreasing in α and R is increasing in α.
If case (c) applies, then R¯ x = β−1 and
(A-7) p =
α
 ¯ b0 + y
 
1 − φ − α¯ h0
,
and the price p is increasing in α.
If case (d) applies, p =ˆ p and R¯ x = β−1.
Proof.I fp /p < β−1, high-interest agents do not own houses in equilibrium. Indeed, we know
from Lemma 1 that we must have R¯ x ≥ β−1.S i n c ep /p < β−1 ≤ R¯ x, owning houses without
leverage is worse than owning bonds for high-interest agents. More generally, even the return on

















<β −1 ≤ R¯ x.











It follows that we cannot have φ = 0, since otherwise p /p = β−1. To derive the other conditions,
we ﬁrst consider R¯ x>β −1, which corresponds to cases (a) and (b). We then consider R¯ x = β−1,
which corresponds to case (c) and (d).
Cases (a) and (b). We ﬁrst show that if there is an equilibrium with p>β p   and R¯ x>β −1,
either case (a) or case (b) applies. If R¯ x>β −1, high-interest agents invest all their wealth in
bonds and hold no houses. We must then have (A-8) hold with equality. Indeed, if (A-8) were to
hold strictly, then low-interest agents would invest all wealth in leveraged portfolios, so that all
31agents would save all wealth and the house price would be pinned down by (A-1). Substituting
this price formula back into (A-8), we obtain
(A-9) ¯ b +˜ p>˜ p¯ h0 + y +¯ b0,
where ˜ p = βp  (1 − φ + φβRx)
−1. The last inequality contradicts our assumption (7). To see
this, deﬁne the function
h(p): =
¯ b + p
p¯ h0 + y +¯ b0
,
which is strictly increasing since ¯ h0 < 1a n d¯ b<¯ b0 + y. We can write (A-9) as h(˜ p) > 1
and (7) as h(βp ¯ x/x) < 1, so that we would need ˜ p>β p  ¯ x/x. However, R¯ x>β −1 implies
˜ p<ˆ p<β p  ¯ x/x, a contradiction.
Since (A-8) holds with equality, low-interest agents must be indiﬀerent between consumption
and holding leveraged portfolios. There must be a subset of low-interest agents that holds all
houses and issues φp mortgages. These mortgages, together with the debt issued by the ROE,
must in turn be held by high-interest agents. Since high-interest agents invest all wealth in
bonds, the total outstanding debt must be equal to high-interest agents’ wealth. For the bond
market to clear, the equilibrium house price must satisfy
(A-10) ¯ b + φp =( 1− α)
 
p¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
.
The solution for the house price is (A-5). The interest rate R is then pinned down by (A-8),
which we have assumed to hold with equality. The solution for the interest rate is (A-6).
The solutions (p,R) in (A-5) - (A-6) must satisfy p>β p   and R¯ x>β −1. Since they are
equilibrium prices, they must also be positive, which gives rise to two possibilities. Assume ﬁrst
that
(A-11) φ/¯ h0 > (1 − α) > ¯ b/
 ¯ b0 + y
 
.
The conditions p>β p   and R¯ x>β −1 can now be written as
¯ b + φβp  < (1 − α)
 
βp ¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
, (A-12)
¯ b +ˆ pφ > (1 − α)
 
ˆ p¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
, (A-13)
32which deﬁnes the cutoﬀs for α in case (a).
A second set of parameters that leads to positive prices is
(A-14) ¯ b/
 ¯ b0 + y
 
> (1 − α) >φ / ¯ h0.
The conditions p>β p   and R¯ x>β −1 now deﬁne the cutoﬀs for α in case (b):
¯ b + φβp  > (1 − α)
 
βp ¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
, (A-15)
¯ b +ˆ pφ < (1 − α)
 
ˆ p¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
. (A-16)
It remains to deﬁne
φ∗ = ¯ h0
¯ b
¯ b0 + y
.
We have thus shown that existence of an equilibrium with p>β p   and R¯ x>β −1 implies either
(a) or (b).
We now show that there exist values of α that satisfy these conditions. Begin with case (a)
and consider the function
f (p): =
¯ b + φp
p¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
,
which is continuously diﬀerentiable with
f  (p)=
φ




p¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 2 ,
and is therefore strictly increasing if and only if φ>φ ∗. Conditions (A-12) and (A-13) can be
written as f (ˆ p) > 1 − α>f(βp). If follows that, if φ>φ ∗, there exist values of α that satisfy
both conditions simultaneously. Any such value of α will also satisfy (A-11), because
lim





¯ b0 + y
.
A similar argument applies to case (b). Indeed, (A-15) and (A-16) can be written as f (ˆ p) <
1 −α<f(βp). If φ<φ ∗,t h e nf is strictly decreasing, which implies that there are values of α
that satisfy (A-14) – (A-16).
Suppose now that we have a pair (φ,α) that satisﬁes the conditions of case (a) or (b) and
suppose prices are given by (A-5) – (A-6). The bond market clears by construction of the house
33price. For the housing market to clear, the wealth of the low-interest agents evaluated at p must
be high enough that these agents can aﬀord to hold all houses:
(A-17) (1 − φ)p ≤ α
 
p¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
.
Since (A-10) is assumed to hold, (A-17) is equivalent to
¯ b + p ≤ p¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y.
But this inequality is implied by (7) since R¯ x>β −1 guarantees p<ˆ p. If we are in case (a),
(A-11) holds and implies that the price (A-5) decreasing in α, while the interest rate (A-6) is
increasing in α.
To sum up, we have shown that an equilibrium with p>β p   exists if either φ>φ ∗ and
conditions (A-12) – (A-13) hold or φ<φ ∗ and conditions (A-15) – (A-16) hold. For either case,
there are values of α that satisfy the conditions. Finally, if either pair of conditions holds, there
is an equilibrium with prices (A-5) – (A-6) that satisﬁes p>β p  .
Case (c). We show that if there is an equilibrium such that p>β p  , R¯ x = β−1 and (A-8) holds
with strict inequality, then case (c) applies. Under these conditions, low-interest agents invest
all their wealth in a leveraged portfolio strategy. Since high-interest agents do not hold houses,
housing equity in the entire housing stock must equal the wealth of low-interest agents:
(A-18) (1 − φ)p = α
 
p¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
.
The solution for the house price is (A-7).
The solution for p must be positive, so that α ≤ (1 − φ)/¯ h0. In addition, it must satisfy
p>β p   as well as (A-8) with strict inequality. This implies the cutoﬀs for case (c):
(1− φ)βp  <α
 
βp ¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
, (A-19)
(1 − φ)ˆ p>α
 
ˆ p¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
. (A-20)
We now show that there exist values of α that satisfy the conditions of case (c). The function
g (p): =
(1 − φ)p
p¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
34is strictly increasing and continuous in p, with limp→∞ g (p)=( 1− φ)/¯ h0. It follows that there
exist values of α that satisfy g (βp ) <α<g(ˆ p), which is equivalent to (A-19) – (A-20).
Finally, suppose that there is an α such that (A-19) – (A-20) hold and that the house price
is given by (A-7). This price is positive since g is strictly increasing so that (A-21) implies
α<g(ˆ p) < lim
p→∞g (p)=( 1− φ)/¯ h0.
The house market clears by construction. For the bond market to clear, the wealth of the
high-interest agents must be high enough at p to absorb all bonds, that is,
(A-21) ¯ b + φp < (1 − α)
 
p¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
.
Since (A-18) holds, (A-21) is equivalent to
¯ b + p<p ¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y.
This inequality is implied by (7) since (A-8) guarantees p<ˆ p. W eh a v et h u ss h o w nt h a ta n
equilibrium with p>β p   and R¯ x = β−1 exists only if (A-19) – (A-20) hold. There are values
of α that satisfy these conditions. Given the conditions, there is an equilibrium with R¯ x = β−1
and house price (A-7). The house price is also increasing in α.
Case (d). We show that if there is an equilibrium such that p>β p  , R¯ x = β−1 and (A-8) holds
with equality, then case (d) applies. Substituting R¯ x = β−1 into (A-8) and solving for the house
price, we obtain p =ˆ p.S i n c eR¯ x = β−1 >p  /p, high-interest agents do not hold houses. Since
Rx <β −1, low-interest agents do not hold bonds. For the house market to clear, the wealth of
the low-interest agents–evaluated at the price ˆ p–must be high enough so that these agents can
aﬀord the housing equity required to purchase the entire housing stock:
(A-22) (1 − φ)ˆ p ≤ α
 
ˆ p¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
.
At the same time, bond market clearing requires that the wealth of the high-interest agents is
high enough so that they can absorb all bonds:
(A-23) ¯ b + φˆ p ≤ (1 − α)
 
ˆ p¯ h0 +¯ b0 + y
 
.
35We have thus derived the conditions for case (d). Condition (7) implies that there exist values
of α that satisfy both inequalities. Finally, if there is an α that falls under case (d), then (A-22)
says that we can pick a subset of the low-interest agents that holds all houses as part of leveraged
portfolios, while (A-23) says that we can pick a subset of the high-interest agents who hold all
bonds.
Proposition 1∗.
(a) For every maximal LTV ratio φ<1, there exist cutoﬀs ¯ αR and αR such that 1 > ¯ αR ≥
αR > 0 and the equilibrium nominal interest rate satisﬁes
R = β−1/x if α ≥ ¯ αR,
R = β−1/¯ x if α ≤ αR,
R ∈ [β−1/¯ x,β−1/x]o t h e r w i s e .
(b) For every maximal LTV ratio φ ∈ (0,1), there exist cutoﬀs ¯ αp and αp such that ¯ αR ≥ ¯ αp >
αp > 0 and the equilibrium house price satisﬁes
p = βp  if α/ ∈ (αp, ¯ αR],
p>β p   if α ∈ (αp, ¯ αp),
p ∈ [βp , ˆ p]o t h e r w i s e .
Moreover, there exists α ∈ (αp, ¯ αR) such that there is an equilibrium with p =ˆ p.






 ¯ b + φˆ p
 
/ ¯ w(ˆ p)i f φ<φ ∗,





¯ αp if φ<φ ∗,
1 −
 ¯ b + φˆ p
 
/ ¯ w(ˆ p)i f φ ≥ φ∗.
Part (a). If φ ≥ φ∗, then there is an equilibrium with Rx = β−1, by case (a) of Lemma 2.
Lemmas 2 and 3 imply also that there cannot be any other type of equilibrium. If φ<φ ∗,t h e n
36case (b) of Lemma 3 says that
¯ αR =1−
 ¯ b + φˆ p
 




This means that for every α ≥ ¯ αR, there is an equilibrium with Rx = β−1, again by case (a)
of Lemma 2. Inspection of the other case in Lemmas 2 and 3 again shows that this is the only
equilibrium. Any α ≤ αR must satisfy the conditions of either case (b) of Lemma 2, or case (c)
or case (d) of Lemma 3. It cannot satisfy the conditions of any other case. In all the relevant
cases, the equilibrium interest rate is R¯ x = β−1.
Part (b). For α>¯ αR, the only equilibrium is that of case (a) of Lemma 2, which has p = βp .I f
α ≤ αp, the only type of equilibrium is case (b) of Lemma 2, which has p = βp .I fαp ≤ α ≤ ¯ αp,
then Lemma 2 does not apply. Comparing the cutoﬀs, one of the cases in Lemma 3 always
applies, so that p>β p  . Finally, for every φ>0, there exist values of α such that part (d) of
Lemma 3 applies. In the latter equilibrium, p =ˆ p.
Proposition 2∗.
(a) If borrowing is not possible (φ = 0), then p = βp  for all α.
(b) The cutoﬀs αp ¯ αp, ¯ αR,a n dαR that govern house price and interest rate behavior are
decreasing in the maximal LTV value φ.I np a r t i c u l a r ,w eh a v e




¯ αp (φ)=1 −









∈ (0,1) such that
(i) if φ ∈ (φ∗,1), equilibrium is unique for all α and
¯ αp (φ)=¯ αR (φ) >α R (φ) >α p (φ).
The interest rate is continuous and nondecreasing in the fraction α, whereas the house
price is continuous and hump-shaped in α,w i t ham a x i m u mo fp =ˆ p.
37(ii) if φ ∈ (0,φ ∗), then
¯ αR (φ) > ¯ αp (φ)=αR (φ) >α p (φ).
For α ≤ ¯ αp (φ), the interest rate and house price are continuous and nondecreasing
in the fraction α.I fα ≥ ¯ αR (φ), then Rx = β−1 and p = βp .I fα ∈ [¯ αp (φ), ¯ αR(φ)],
there can be up to three equilibria with R ∈ [β−1/¯ x,β−1/x]a n dp ∈ [βp , ˆ p].
Proof. Part (a). If φ = 0, then Lemma 3 does not apply. The result follows directly from
Lemma 2.
Part (b). The formulas for ¯ αp and αp follow directly from the proof of Proposition 1. These
cutoﬀs are decreasing in φ,s i n c e ¯ w is positive and does not depend on φ. To show that ¯ αp and
αp are also decreasing in φ, it is suﬃcient to show that (b + φˆ p)/¯ w(ˆ p)i si n c r e a s i n gi nφ.T h e
derivative












 ¯ b +ˆ pφ
 
1 − φ + φ
x
¯ x
is positive since (7) guarantees ¯ w(ˆ p) > ¯ b +ˆ p and h0, φ and x/¯ x are all smaller than one.




> ¯ b + βp φ,
and therefore implies that ¯ αp >α p for all φ. Case (c) of Lemma 3 implies that αR >α p for all
φ.
If φ>φ ∗, the conditions of Lemmas 2 and 3 are mutually exclusive, and exactly one case of
Lemma 3 can be relevant for a given value of α. Equilibrium is thus unique. Moreover, Lemma
3 implies that the price is increasing in α in case (c) and decreasing in case (a). Comparing the
price formulas shows that the price is continuous and hump-shaped. Similarly, case (a) of Lemma
3 says that the interest rate is increasing, while it is constant in all other cases. Comparison of
the formulas shows that the interest rate is also continuous.
If φ<φ ∗,¯ αR > ¯ αp follows from case (b) of Lemma 3. Unless α ∈ [¯ αp, ¯ αR], exactly one of
the cases in Lemma 3 applies, so that equilibrium is unique. If α ∈ [¯ αp, ¯ αR], then case (a) of
Lemma 2 as well as cases (b) and (c) of Lemma 3 can in principle all apply. Therefore, there
38can be up to three equilibria.
Remarks. If φ is low, multiple equilibria can obtain for some intermediate values of α (case (ii)).
This happens because, with risk neutrality, portfolio choice reacts to prices only through discrete
jumps, while the eﬀect of prices on wealth is continuous. Consider again the thought experiment
where initially all agents agree on real rates and then some are replaced by high-interest types.
For high α, bond demand is due to high-interest agents, whose wealth is increasing in the house
price. At the same time, the supply of bonds comes in part from borrowing by low-interest
agents. Locally, the latter also increases with the house price, as the borrowing constraint is
relaxed. Both supply and demand are locally not sensitive to the interest rate. Markets can
then clear both at a high house price, which give rises to high supply and demand, and at a
low house price, which gives rise to low supply and demand.11 Since this multiplicity is due
to auxiliary assumptions and does not aﬀect the main eﬀect we emphasize–house price booms
occur for intermediate values of α–we do not use it in our interpretation of the model below.
Proof of Proposition 1. Proposition 1 establishes the existence of cutoﬀs for price and





part (c,i) of Proposition 2∗ shows uniqueness, the special form of the cutoﬀs, as well as the
monotonicity of the interest rate and the hump shape of the house price.
Proof of Proposition 2. Part (a) is the same as part (a) of Proposition 2∗.P a r t ( b )
follows from part (a) of Proposition 1∗.
Part (c) follows from part (c,i) of Proposition 2∗.
11If φ is higher, bond supply becomes more sensitive to the interest rate and equilibrium is unique. The same
is true if the exogenous bond supply ¯ b is smaller; in fact, φ
∗ =0i f¯ b = 0. In addition, equilibrium is unique if
bond demand becomes less sensitive to the house price as ¯ h0 falls; we have φ
∗ =0a l s oi f¯ h0 =0 .
























































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Price-dividend ratios for housing measured with BIS house price indices (left scale)
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Figure3: Price-dividend ratiosforhousing and stocks measured with datafrom nationalaccounts
(on the same scale).Nominal interest rate R
House price p










Figure 4: Stylized plot of the equilibrium nominal interest rate R and house price p,b o t h
as functions of the fraction α of low-interest agents who believe that nominal bonds have low
payoﬀs, x. Solid lines are for an initial equilibrium; dotted lines are for an equilibrium with a
higher maximal LTV ratio φ.